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Expanding Printz in the Sanctuary City Debate
ABSTRACT
American attitudes toward immigration shift with changes in the
nation's economic and political climate. While waves of immigration to the
United States are motivated by various factors, the extent to which
immigrants are welcomed in the country does not consider these motivations.
Rather, American perspectives of immigration vary by region and are
informed by local economies and ideological majorities. Thus, while some
localities work closely with federal immigration officials to facilitate federal
regulatory schemes, other localities adopt policies that prohibit cooperation
with federal immigration law, becoming "sanctuary cities" for
undocumented immigrants. This Comment explores the constitutionality of
afederal provision that attempts to subvert the ability of sanctuary cities to
implement policies they believe promote trust and communication with local
immigrant communities and which ultimately improve public safety.
Analyzed within the framework of Tenth Amendment federalism and state
sovereignty, this federal provision is an invalid infringement of states 'power
to sustain sanctuary cities.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 2003, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims began its first session of the 108th
Congress with a "difficult, confused, and a very emotionally charged issue":
sanctuary cities.' The hearing was held in response to a brutal rape and
robbery that occurred on December 19, 2002 at Flushing Meadows Park in
Queens.2 The victim and several of her assailants were undocumented
immigrants.3 Concerned that New York City's (the City's) sanctuary policy
may have enabled the attack, the House members engaged a panel of local
law enforcement officers, federal immigration officers, and immigrant
advocates to discuss the nationwide effect of sanctuary policies on federal
immigration enforcement efforts.4
The City's controversial sanctuary policy originated in 1989. Mayor
Edward Koch issued an executive order prohibiting local law enforcement
officers from sharing identification information about undocumented
immigrants with federal immigration authorities.5  This order of
noncompliance with federal immigration authorities deemed the City a
1. New York City's 'Sanctuary'Policy and the Effect of Such Policies on Public Safety,
Law Enforcement, and immigration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border
Sec., & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 49 (2003) [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Chris Cannon, Member, Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., &
Claims). Sanctuary cities are defined by local policies that restrict local law enforcement
agencies' cooperation with federal immigration authorities. Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a
"Sanctuary"?, 61 SMU L. REv. 133, 147-48 (2008). For example, some policies prohibit
local law enforcement officers from inquiring about the immigration status of an individual
or restrict the sharing of such information with federal immigration authorities. Id. at 148-
49.
2. Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Rep. John N. Hostettler, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims); Paul Menchaca, All Five Suspects Plead
Guilty to 2002 Flushing Meadows Rape, QUEENS CHRON., Dec. 11, 2003.
3. Hearing, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Rep. John N. Hostettler, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims).
4. Id. at 1-3.
5. N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 124 (Aug. 7, 1989), https://perma.cc/2XZZ-Q85R.
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sanctuary jurisdiction.6 The City's sanctuary policy reflected a commitment
to "community-based policing," wherein law enforcement agents
encouraged crime reporting to ultimately reduce crime by developing trust
with immigrant communities. Consistent with the goal of crime reduction,
the order contained an exception for immigrants suspected of engaging in
criminal activity.8  Koch's successors, Mayors Dinkins and Giuliani,
reissued the order, 9 and it endured until Congress passed section 642 of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA). 10
Congress enacted IIRIRA in a series of border security and welfare
reform measures that were passed in response to the surge in U.S.
immigration during the 1990s. 11 Section 642 was eventually codified as 8
U.S.C. § 1373.12 Section 1373, entitled "Communication between
government agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,"
prohibits state and local governments from restricting the sending, receiving,
maintaining, and exchanging of information regarding the immigration
status of any individual with federal immigration authorities. 3
After its passage, Mayor Giuliani filed a lawsuit against the United
States challenging the constitutionality of § 1373.14 Giuliani relied on Printz
v. United States 5 to argue that § 1373 violated Tenth Amendment principles
of federalism and improperly trammeled state sovereignty.16 The district
6. Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Rep. John N. Hostettler, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims).
7. Id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Subcomm. on Immigration,
Border Sec., & Claims).
8. N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 124, § 2(a)(3) (Aug. 7, 1989), https://perma.cc/2XZZ-
Q85R.
9. See, e.g., Rudolph W. Giuliani, Mayor of N.Y.C., Address at the Conference on the
New Immigrants in Cowles Auditorium, Minnesota (Sept. 30, 1996) (transcript available in
the Archives of Rudolph W. Giuliani, https://perma.cc/KGQ4-82AZ).
10. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, § 642, 110 Star. 3009, 3009-707 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012)).
11. See, e.g., Audrey Singer, Welfare Reform and Immigrants: A Policy Review, in
IMMIGRANTS, WELFARE REFORM, AND THE POVERTY OF POLICY 21, 26 (Philip Kretsedemans
& Ana Aparicio eds., 2004).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
13. Id.
14. City of New York v. United States (City of New York]), 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), aff'd, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
15. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
16. City of New York 1, 971 F. Supp. at 797-98. Specifically, the City argued that
Congress has stripped State and local governments of choice and control over their
own policies .... The fear of this precise danger-that Congress would devour the
3
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court dismissed Giuliani's claim,17 and, on appeal, the Second Circuit upheld
§ 1373 as constitutional.' 8 Thus, when the Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims held its hearing in 2003, it understood § 1373
to be a constitutional preemption of the City's sanctuary policy.' 9
The members of the Subcommittee sought to confirm that in the wake
of the Second Circuit's decision and the Flushing Meadows tragedy, the City
had terminated its sanctuary policy to comply with § 1373.20 New York City
Criminal Justice Coordinator, John Feinblatt, assured the Subcommittee that
the City was in compliance with § 1373 but defended its sanctuary policy:
"[The policy] was based upon the concern that the public's health, welfare,
and safety could be harmed if, out of fear of being reported to the
[Immigration and Naturalization Service], immigrants were reluctant to
make use of city services."'', Feinblatt's statement echoes a perspective
frequently overlooked in the sanctuary city debate; it is also the very
argument Mayor Giuliani made in City of New York seven years prior-that
§ 1373 violates a locality's constitutionally protected police power to
implement sanctuary policies.
essence of State sovereignty-is what mobilized the States, including the State of
New York, to demand the Tenth Amendment.
Appellants' Brief at 24-25, City of New York v. United States (City of New York1I), 179 F.3d
29 (2d Cir. 1999) (No. 97-6182) [hereinafter Appellants' Brief].
17. City of New YorkI, 971 F. Supp. at 798.
18. City of New York I, 179 F.3d at 37.
19. Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Rep. John N. Hostettler, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims) ("New York City challenged [section 642
of the IIRIRA] in Federal court and lost.").
20. See id. The chairman set the context of the hearing by stating:
We will examine whether New York City continued E.O. 124, amended it, or
scrapped it altogether. We will also examine what guidance the city has sent to its
officers on the street about reporting criminal aliens to the INS. At this hearing, the
Subcommittee will also explore what effect any New York City sanctuary policy
had on the fact that the three illegal aliens with arrest histories had not been
deported.
Id.
21. Id. at 11 (statement of John Feinblatt, Criminal Justice Coordinator of the City of
New York). In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service was replaced by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and its functions
transferred to three component agencies: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and United States Citizen and Immigration Services
(USCIS). See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified
as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). ICE is responsible for identifying and detaining
persons in violation of federal immigration law and is the agency with which sanctuary cities
bar information sharing. See Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://perma.cc/UC3K-MXCD.
22. See infra Part II.
[Vol. 40:1
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The remainder of the Subcommittee hearing reflects a debate peppered
with ideological clashes regarding the role of local law enforcement agencies
in federal immigration regulatory schemes.23 While some participants
commended § 1373 and cautioned against the "dangerous message of
ambivalence" that sanctuary policies portray,24 others highlighted that
sanctuary policies are "widely recognized as an effective tool for keeping
kids off drugs, combating gang violence, and reducing crime rates in
neighborhoods around the country. , 25 Similarly, one Subcommittee member
contended that without sanctuary policies, the victim of the Flushing
Meadow tragedy may not have sought legal and medical recourse, and the
attack "should not be used to paint the lives of all immigrants." 26 A solution
to this dichotomy evaded the 108th Congress. 27 Notwithstanding purported
preemption by § 1373, Mayor Bloomberg issued two executive orders
instituting sanctuary policies within seven months of the 2003 Subcommittee
hearing. 28 The 108th Congress did not again take up the issue.
29
New York City is only one example of ajurisdiction that has maintained
sanctuary policies despite the Second Circuit's upholding of § 1373 in City
of New York H.'3 Sanctuary cities in states across the country have continued
to coexist with § 1373, 3' and though they have collided with § 1373 in
lawsuits since City of New York 11,32 the controversies have done little to
23. Hearing, supra note 1, at 39-65.
24. Id. at 15 (statement of Michael J. Cutler, former Senior Special Agent, New York
District Office, Immigration and Naturalization Services).
25. Id. at 7 (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Subcomm. on Immigration,
Border Sec., & Claims).
26. Id. app. at 68 (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Member, Subcomm. on
Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims).
27. See Public Laws: 108th Congress (2003-2004), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://perma.cc/5D4M-QBCP.
28. N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 34 (May 13, 2003), https://perma.cc/R7SL-V47B;
N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 41 (Sept. 17, 2003), https://perma.cc/H67L-KKZY.
29. See Public Laws: 108th Congress (2003-2004), supra note 27.
30. See Bryan Griffith & Jessica Vaughan, Maps: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States,
CTR. FOR IMMLGR. STUD. (July 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/9LA4-QS2Z.
31. See, e.g., Memorandum from Kevin L. Faulconer, Mayor, City of San Diego, to Hon.
Myrtle Cole, President, San Diego City Council (Mar. 15, 2017) (on file with Campbell Law
Review) (affirming the continuation San Diego Police Department's "long-standing policy
where officers do not initiate contact for the sole purpose of checking an individual's
immigration status, nor do they ask for the immigration status of victims or witnesses of
crimes").
32. See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-574-WHO; No.17-cv-00485-
WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62871, at *85 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017) ("The Government
repeatedly emphasizes in its briefing that it does not know what it means to 'willfully refuse
to comply' with Section 1373. Past DOJ guidance and various court cases interpreting Section
5
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definitively settle the relationship between the policies and § 1373.
Similarly, federal lawmakers have failed to pass proposed anti-sanctuary city
measures despite a range of attempts within the last nine years.33
Nonetheless, federal lawmakers have not ceded the command of § 1373 in
the sanctuary city debate.
On June 22, 2017, federal legislators introduced H.R. 3003, the "No
Sanctuary for Criminals Act," in the House of Representatives as a bill to
amend § 1373. 34 H.R. 3003 expands the scope of§ 1373 by barring state and
local governments from commanding its officials to limit or restrict
"compl[iance] with the immigration laws.., or from assisting or
cooperating with Federal law enforcement entities, officials, or other
personnel regarding the enforcement of [immigration] laws."35 The scope of
H.R. 3003 is broader than § 1373. Whereas § 1373 prohibits local policies
that interfere with the flow of information to federal immigration authorities,
H.R. 3003 prohibits local policies that constitute any form of noncompliance
with federal immigration authorities. For example, noncompliance with
federal immigration authorities under H.R. 3003 encompasses not only
restrictions on information sharing, but also restrictions on inquiring into
immigration status.36 H.R. 3003 therefore shortens the slack § 1373 left for
the working relationship between immigrants and local police, adding a new
1373 have not reached consistent conclusions as to what [Section] 1373 requires."); Steile
v. City of S.F., 230 F. Supp. 3d 994, 1015-16 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding San Francisco did
not violate § 1373 when it withheld an undocumented inmate's release date from ICE);
Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a Los
Angeles sanctuary policy prohibiting police interaction with individuals initiated to obtain
immigration information did not violate § 1373).
33. See, e.g., Ending Sanctuary Cities Act of 2016, H.R. 6252, 114th Cong. (2016) (no
action after referral to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security on Oct. 21,
2016); Stop Dangerous Sanctuary Cities Act, H.R. 5654, 114th Cong. (2016) (no action after
referral to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security on July 20, 2016); Stop
Sanctuary Policies and Protect Americans Act, S. 2146, 114th Cong. (2015) (cloture not
invoked by the Senate on October 20, 2015); Protecting American Citizens Together (PACT)
Act, S. 1764, 114th Cong. (2015) (no committee action after July 14, 2015 introduction);
Mobilizing Against Sanctuary Cities Act of 2011, H.R. 2057, 112th Cong. (2011) (no action
after referral to the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement on July 11, 2011);
Putting an End to Sanctuary Cities Act, H.R. 5796, 111 th Cong. (2010) (no action after referral
to the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and
International Law on July 26, 2010); Loophole Elimination and Verification Enforcement
(LEAVE) Act, H.R. 6789, 110th Cong. (2008) (no action after referral to the Subcommittee
on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism on Sept. 29, 2008).
34. No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, H.R. 3003, 115th Cong. (2017).
35. Id. at § 2(a).
36. Id.
[Vol. 40:1
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wrinkle to the web of ideologies that have complicated the sanctuary city
debate since City of New York II.
The anomalous yet enduring coexistence of sanctuary cities and § 1373
illustrates two opposing constitutional philosophies. One embraces
sanctuary policies as an exercise of state police power guaranteed by the
Tenth Amendment, while the other deems sanctuary policies preempted by
§ 1373 under the Supremacy Clause.3 7 The proper place of sanctuary cities
thus involves a boundary dispute between the dueling sovereigns that must
be resolved by constitutional principles of federalism. In upholding § 1373
as constitutional, City of New York II represents a critical juncture in the
development of the sanctuary city discourse. City of New York II enabled
§ 1373 to cloud potential compatibility between sanctuary cities and federal
immigration law. Likewise, since City of New York II did not draw a
definitive line between § 1373 and sanctuary cities,3 8 solutions to what has
become an ongoing national controversy are often encumbered by partisan
immigration politics to prevent a just, final resolution.
This Comment addresses the barrier to the mutual sovereignty of local
law enforcement agencies and federal immigration law that § 1373 has
created since City of New York II. Part I of this Comment explores the
philosophy of sanctuary cities to illustrate their relationship to public safety
and community policing. Part II analyzes City of New York II to conclude
that the Second Circuit provided an incomplete analysis of § 1373 and likely
would have held § 1373 unconstitutional with a proper interpretation of
sanctuary policies, the Tenth Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause. Part
III proposes two solutions that would resolve the boundary dispute between
federal immigration law enforcement and sanctuary cities without
compromising the respective powers of either.
I. PUBLIC SAFETY IN SANCTUARY CITIES
There is no singular legal definition of the term "sanctuary city.
39
Reduced to its most basic denominator, a sanctuary city is a locality that,
37. See Raina Bhatt, Note, Pushing an End to Sanctuary Cities: Will It Happen?, 22
MICH. J. RACE & L. 139, 148-49, 153-54 (2016).
38. For example, New York City has maintained sanctuary policies throughout the
roughly twenty years since the enactment of § 1373 and City of New York II. Liz Robbins,
Council Seeks to Counter Trump's Crackdown on Undocumented Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 27, 2017, at A21.
39. SARAH S. HERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44795, STATE AND LOCAL
"SANCTUARY" POLICIES LIMITING PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 3 (2017)
("Still, there is no official definition of a 'sanctuary' jurisdiction in federal statute or
regulation.").
7
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through uncodified policy 40 or official ordinance, 41 limits its cooperation
with federal immigration policies. 42  In a March 2017 report,43 the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) identified three primary policies of
noncompliance which sanctuary cities may implement: "don't enforce,"
"don't ask," or "don't tell. '44 The CRS defines "don't enforce" policies as
the prohibition of collaboration between local law enforcement officials and
federal immigration officials.45 It defines "don't ask" policies as barring the
affirmative discovery of an individual's immigration status, and "don't tell"
policies as barring the sharing of such information with federal immigration
officials.46 Mayors, state legislators, and other local government officials
institute sanctuary policies, which are primarily implemented by local law
enforcement agencies during the course of everyday policing processes.
47
Sanctuary cities emerged with the onset of the sanctuary movement of
the 1980s, during which time churches extended harbor to Central American
refugees.48 However, as illustrated by the testimony of Mr. Feinblatt at the
40. See, e.g., Memorandum from Kevin L. Faulconer, supra note 31 (affirming the
continuation of San Diego Police Department's "long-standing policy where officers do not
initiate contact for the sole purpose of checking an individual's immigration status, nor do
they ask for the immigration status of victims or witnesses of crimes").
41. See, e.g., MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 19.30(a)(1), (3) (2017)
(providing that "[p]ublic safety officials shall not undertake any law enforcement action for
the purpose of detecting the presence of undocumented persons, or to verify immigration
status, including but not limited to questioning any person or persons about their immigration
status"; nor shall they "question, arrest or detain any person for violations of federal civil
immigration laws except when immigration status is an element of the crime or when
enforcing 8 U.S.C. 1324(c).").
42. HERMAN, supra note 39.
43. Id.
44. Id. at Summary. The enumeration of these three policies did not originate in the
March 2017 CRS Report. The tri-categorization of these policies emerged in the scholastic
immigration law community. See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime
Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IowA L. REv. 1449, 1457 (2006); Laura Sullivan,
Comment, Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat Posed to Sanctuary Laws by
the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National Crime Information Center Database,
97 CALIF. L. REv. 567, 574 (2009); Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration
Policymaking, 79 UMKC L. REv. 901, 910 (2011); Developments in the Law-Policing
Immigrant Communities, 128 HARV. L. REv. 1771, 1791 n.142 (2015).
45. HERMAN, supra note 39, at Summary.
46. Id.
47. See Su, supra note 44, at 911-12.
48. See Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 CAP. U. L.
REv. 583, 602-03 (2014). During the 1980s, an influx of Nicaraguan, Guatemalan, and
Salvadoran citizens unlawfully entered the United States seeking refuge from civil wars in
their home countries. Id. at 602. Many churches throughout the United States provided
"sanctuary" to the refugees through the efforts of their ministries. Id. at 603.
[Vol. 40:1
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2003 Subcommittee hearing,49 modem perspectives of community safety
50
and administrative efficiency 51 have largely supplanted such faith-based
practices of sanctuary.52 Today, the adoption of sanctuary policies is
primarily motivated by community-based policing methods that prioritize
communication and trust.
A. Communication, Trust, and the Philosophy of Sanctuary Cities
More than one hundred cities and counties in twenty-five states have
instituted sanctuary policies. 54 Local law enforcement agencies within these
jurisdictions prioritize trust in designing policing models that improve public
safety.55 Their philosophy of trust is based on the concern that immigrants
may be reluctant to report crimes if they believe local police officers will
share their information with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
49. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 10-13 (statement of John Feinblatt, Criminal Justice
Coordinator of the City of New York).
50. See MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS IMMIGRATION COMM., M.C.C. IMMIGRATION COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS By LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES
6 (2006) ("Immigration enforcement by local police would likely negatively effect [sic] and
undermine the level of trust and cooperation between local police and immigrant
communities. If the undocumented immigrant's primary concern is that they will be deported
or subjected to an immigration status investigation, then they will not come forward and
provide needed assistance and cooperation.").
51. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L.
REv. 245, 291-92 (2016) (noting that "[local officials throughout the country have realized
that immigration enforcement requires investment of personnel hours, facility costs,
transportation resources, and other related expenses" and that "[c]ontroversy over who will
pay for immigration enforcement has only grown more tense as state and local budgets have
shrunk, while the federal government's immigration budget has ballooned.").
52. See Davidson, supra note 48, at 608 ("Referred to as the New Sanctuary Movement
in the United States since at least 2006, a small number of churches in the United States have
either offered sanctuary to illegal immigrants or expressed their intent to do so.").
53. See, e.g., Press Release, The U.S. Conference of Mayors, U.S. Mayors, Police Chiefs
Concerned with Sanctuary Cities Executive Order (Jan. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/8XP9-
8MPH ("Local police departments work hard to build and preserve trust with all of the
communities they serve, including immigrant communities. Immigrants residing in our cities
must be able to trust the police and all of city government.").
54. See Griffith & Vaughan, supra note 30.
55. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and
Representative of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 247, 249-50
(2012).
9
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agents. 56 Immigrants often reside in neighborhoods with high crime rates 57
and can be both victims of and witnesses to crimes.58 Officials reason
immigrants' fear of deportation may isolate local law enforcement agencies
from critical information about crime and, in turn, inhibit effective policing
and overall community safety. 59 Recent trends in crime reporting suggest
that these apprehensions are not unfounded.60
Statistics from police departments in Texas, California, and New Jersey
show a decrease in the number of crime reports made by immigrants since
the inauguration of President Trump. 61 For example, data from Houston
reflects that between January and March 2017, Hispanics reported 13%
fewer violent crimes, 43% fewer rapes and sexual assaults, 12% fewer
aggravated assaults, and 8% fewer robberies than they reported in the first
three months of 2016.62 In Los Angeles, Hispanics reported 10% fewer
domestic violence incidents and 25% fewer rapes in the first three months of
2017 as compared to 2016.63 Camden County in New Jersey reported that
calls from the undocumented community decreased by 6% in the first four
months of 2017.64
Police chiefs from these jurisdictions attribute the decrease in crime
reporting to the Trump administration's promise to intensify national
deportation efforts.6 5 According to Houston Police Department Chief Art
Acevedo, immigrants are "afraid that we're more interested as a society in
deporting them than we are in bringing justice to the victims of crime., 66
56. See NIK THEODORE, DEP'T OF URBAN PLANNING & POLICY, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI.,
INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT (2013), https://perma.cc/BJ6L-DEGW.
57. Chase Sackett, HIUD, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime, EVIDENCE MATTERS,
Summer 2016, https://perma.cc/STP4-YZB8.
58. See Michael Kagan, Immigrant Victims, Immigrant Accusers, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 915, 916-21 (2015).
59. See THEODORE, supra note 56.
60. Lindsey Bever, Hispanics 'Are Going Further into the Shadows' amid Chilling
Immigration Debate, Police Say, WASH. POST (May 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/7VBG-
53MN.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, DHS: Immigration Agents May Arrest Crime Victims,
Witnesses at Courthouses, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/C3YG-QQKY;
Jennifer Medina, Too Scared to Report Abuse, For Fear ofBeing Deported, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 2017, at Al; Tom Dart, Fearing Deportation, Undocumented Immigrants Wary of
Reporting Crimes, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/S9EX-FLEG.
66. John Burnett, New Immigration Crackdowns Creating 'Chilling Effect' On Crime
Reporting, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 25, 2017),
[Vol. 40:1
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Likewise, Camden County Police Chief Scott Thompson stated:
"[Immigrants'] fear is palpable, and it's.., altered [the community's]
relationship with the police department in a reluctance to communicate with
us. ,67 These reports reflect that sanctuary policies are adopted in response
to immigrants' fears and are designed to counteract the effect that
immigrants' distrust of local law enforcement can have on public safety.
B. The Mechanics of Sanctuary Policies
Few sanctuary policies promise absolute bans on cooperation with
federal immigration authorities. Sanctuary policies often contain exceptions
to their general rules of noncompliance for circumstances that pose threats
to public safety. For example, the New York City sanctuary policy examined
by the 2003 House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims, contained an exception to the prohibition on information sharing
where an undocumented immigrant was suspected of engaging in criminal
activity. 68 Likewise, Chicago-characterized as one of the nation's most
immigrant-friendly cities69-has a comprehensive sanctuary policy
restricting the disclosure of information to ICE yet carves out an exception
for individuals with outstanding criminal warrants, felony charges or
convictions, and those identified as gang members.70 Los Angeles provides
another example of a sanctuary city that nonetheless shares select
information in a national law enforcement database routinely accessed by
ICE.'
These exceptions demonstrate that while sanctuary policies seek to
foster a certain sense of security within immigrant communities, they
ultimately serve the strategic policing purpose of reducing crime. 2 Indeed,
the philosophy of sanctuary policies and their crime-related exceptions
http://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/529513771/new-immigration-crackdowns-creating-chilling-
effect-on-crime-reporting.
67. See Bever, supra note 60.
68. Hearing, supra note 1, at 4-7 (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Member,
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., & Claims); N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 124, §
2(c) (Aug. 7, 1989), https://perma.cc/2XZZ-Q85R.
69. State Lawmakers Consider Expanding Illinois Immigrant Protections in Response to
Trump, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/YXK9-DMVD.
70. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 2-173-030, -042 (2017).
71. See George Joseph, Where ICE Already Has Direct Lines to Law-Enforcement
Databases with Immigrant Data, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 12, 2017),
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/05/12/479070535/where-ice-already-has-
direct-lines-to-law-enforcement-databases-with-immigrant-d (discussing ICE's relationship
to local law enforcement databases).
72. See MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS IMMIGRATION COMM., supra note 50.
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complement ICE's mission to detain immigrants "who present a danger to
national security or are a risk to public safety. ''  Nevertheless, sanctuary
cities are accused of obstructing federal immigration law-from both
practical and legal standpoints.
C. Common Criticisms of Sanctuary Cities
As hubs for fingerprints, addresses, and other personal identification
data, local law enforcement agencies are considered integral players in the
facilitation of federal immigration enforcement schemes. 7  Sanctuary cities
are thus criticized as practical hindrances to the effectuation of federal
immigration law and even accused of "harbor[ing] criminals.",76 According
to Texas state Senator Charles Perry, sanctuary cities "help people who
commit manslaughter and sexual assault evade federal immigration [law]."77
Similarly, some state officials view sanctuary cities as instrumentalities of
unlawful entry into the United States, creating "magnet[s] for illegal
immigration." 8 These statements underscore a common belief among some
state government officials that sanctuary cities harm local communities and
represent a bulwark against federal regulation of immigration.
Legal scrutiny of sanctuary cities often yields a similar posture. Some
legal scholars argue that federal immigration laws preempt sanctuary
policies under the Supremacy Clause. 7' Two theories of preemption are used
73. Enforcement and Removal Operations, supra note 21.
74. See, e.g., Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Remarks to Federal Law Enforcement
Authorities About Sanctuary Cities (Sept. 19, 2017) (transcript available at
https://perma.cc/67GV-JFMB); Colin Campbell, NC Senate Bill Has Tougher Penalties on
Immigration Sanctuary Cities-and Universities-than House Proposal, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Feb. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/KY8X-G6ZJ; Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1259 (2009).
75. See generally Laurel R. Boatright, Note, "Clear Eye for the State Guy": Clarifying
Authority and Trusting Federalism to Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration
Enforcement, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1643-50 (2006) (discussing state law enforcement of
federal immigration law after the 9/11 terrorist attacks); Address to the Nation on Immigration
Reform, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 931 (May 15, 2006) ("State and local law enforcement
officials are an important part of our border security, and they need to be a part of our strategy
to secure our borders.").
76. See Mark Krikorian, Opinion, Counterpoint: Sanctuary Cities Like Chicago Harbor
Criminals, CHI. SUN TIMES (June 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/WUW7-ZHS4.
77. Priscilla Alvarez, Will Texas's Crackdown on Sanctuary Cities Hurt Law
Enforcement?, THE ATLANTIC (June 6, 2017), http://perma.cc/U86H-9RVN.
78. Nicole Cobler, Lawmaker to Try Again with Bill Banning "Sanctuary Cities", THE
TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2016), http://perma.cc/67N7-EDBK.
79. See, e.g., Linda Reyna Yafiez & Alfonso Soto, Local Police Involvement in the
Enforcement of Immigration Law, 1 HisP. L.J. 9 (1994) (arguing that the supremacy of federal
immigration law forecloses the legality of sanctuary cities). The Supremacy Clause provides
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to support this conclusion: implied field preemption and conflict
preemption.80 Implied field preemption arises where Congress works a
"complete ouster of state power"'" through comprehensive regulation of a
subject.82 Some argue that federal immigration regulatory schemes have
"occupied the field"83 of immigration to foreclose the states' power to
implement sanctuary policies.8 4 Alternatively, conflict preemption arises
where federal law supersedes state law that obstructs the "purposes and
objectives of Congress"85 or renders compliance with federal law a "physical
impossibility. 8 6  Critics reason that conflict preemption invalidates
sanctuary policies-specifically in relation to § 1373-insofar as they curtail
cooperation with federal immigration regulatory schemes.87 While these
theories are grounded in established federalism principles "central to the
constitutional design,"88 they rest on suppositions that cannot be reconciled
with either the nature of sanctuary policies or the Tenth Amendment itself.
The argument that federal immigration laws invalidate sanctuary
policies through implied field preemption relies on a mischaracterization of
the objectives and functions of sanctuary policies. Implied field preemption
is triggered by a federal regulatory scheme "so pervasive ... that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it."8 9 Therefore, implied field
preemption would invalidate sanctuary policies if the policies regulate a field
otherwise occupied by Congress. The occupied field-immigration-
comprises laws that regulate the admission, registration, removal, and
that "[the] Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land .. " U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Supremacy
Clause to enable federal laws to "pre-empt," or nullify, state laws that conflict with federal
laws. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
80. LISA M. SEGHETTI, STEPHEN R. VINA & KARMA ESTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32270, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT 4-6 (2004).
81. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976).
82. Kerry Abrams, Essay, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REv. 601, 607-08
(2013).
83. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 401.
84. See SEGHETTI, supra note 80.
85. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
86. Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
87. See, e.g., Memorandum from Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Karol V. Mason, Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Office of Justice Programs, U.S.
Dep't of Justice (May 31, 2016) (on file with Campbell Law Review) (assessing sanctuary
policies from ten states and localities that raise issues of conflict preemption by § 1373).
88. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399.
89. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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deportation of immigrants. 90 Sanctuary policies do not infringe upon this
field. Although sanctuary policies bear upon and affect immigrants, they do
not attempt to regulate their admission, registration, removal, or deportation.
Rather, sanctuary policies memorialize the policing priorities of local law
enforcement agencies and govern police communications with immigrants
and federal immigration authorities. 9' The theory of implied field
preemption thus fails in the difference between the ambit of the
Congressionally occupied field of immigration and the ambit of sanctuary
policies.
Conflict preemption fails for the same reason. Under conflict
preemption, federal law can only preempt state law that "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. 92 It inheres that conflict preemption arises where
there is an "actual conflict" between state and federal law.93 The objectives
of sanctuary cities and the language of sanctuary policies themselves reflect
that sanctuary cities are not designed to interfere with the efforts of federal
immigration authorities.94 Whereas sanctuary policies advance public safety
and community policing strategies, they cannot obstruct the regulation of the
admission, removal, and deportation of immigrants-a federal interest that
is separate and distinct from local policing. Moreover, sanctuary policies
offer immigrants no legal protection from ICE and from the initiation of
deportation proceedings. 95  Although sanctuary policies limit
communication with federal immigration authorities, they have neither the
purpose nor the power to interfere with the authority of ICE to detain or
deport immigrants. 96 Therefore, without the power to obstruct ICE, or an
attempt to admit, register, or remove immigrants, sanctuary policies do not
pose obstacles to the objectives of federal immigration law and do not invoke
conflict preemption.
90. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 395-96.
91. See Su, supra note 44.
92. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
93. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S.
501, 533 (1912)).
94. See Su, supra note 44, at 910-11.
95. Maura Ewing, In Sanctuary Cities, Immigrants Find Themselves with Few Real
Protections from Federal Officials, PUB. RADIO INT'L (Dec. 29,2016), https://perma.cc/5JSG-
KBYS (quoting Villanova law professor Caitlin Barry, who said, "Sanctuary cities absolutely
do not mean that the city is able to protect people from deportation .... The policy says that
city employees are not going to use their time and resources to facilitate a deportation or to
facilitate the detention of someone who the city's criminal system has already decided to
release.").
96. Id.
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The theory of conflict preemption is no more plausible when applied to
§ 1373, as it rests on the premise that § 1373 is constitutional under the Tenth
Amendment. The power of a federal law to preempt conflicting state law
under the Supremacy Clause is null if the federal law itself does not pass
constitutional muster.1 Conflict preemption thus requires sanctuary policies
to give way to § 1373 where dual compliance is impossible, but only if
§ 1373 does not offend the Tenth Amendment. Conflict preemption,
therefore, cannot categorically invalidate sanctuary policies if the validity of
§ 1373 is not ascertained but merely assumed. It is in this circular interplay
of the Supremacy Clause and the Tenth Amendment where conflict
preemption fails as a means of condemning sanctuary cities.
Considering the function of sanctuary policies and their role in local
law enforcement tactics, it is evident why Mayor Giuliani challenged § 1373
as an infringement of state police power under the Tenth Amendment in City
of New York II-and why he relied on the principles of federalism articulated
in Printz to support his argument. Less clear is the reasoning the Second
Circuit employed to reach the conclusion that § 1373 is constitutional.
II. SECTION 13 73 AND THE TENTH AMENDMENT IN CITY OF NEW YORK V.
UNITED STATES
In City of New York II, the City relied on Printz v. United States98 to
argue that § 1373 violates the Tenth Amendment.9 9 The Second Circuit
distinguished the facts of Printz from the City's claimed constitutional injury
and upheld § 1373.100 While the command of § 1373 is factually distinct
from the federal legislation at issue in Printz, the reasoning of Printz and its
controlling federalist principles suggest that the Second Circuit was
incomplete in its analysis. Discounting the City's Tenth Amendment
argument, the court invoked the Supremacy Clause to denounce the City's
policy of "passive resistance" to § 1373.101
Relying on the facts of Printz rather than its analytical touchstones, the
Second Circuit's decision lacks a thorough examination of the Tenth
Amendment. This deficiency renders the court's treatment of the Supremacy
Clause likewise flawed, as an erroneous-or even inadequate-
97. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096, 2106 (2013)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("Congress cannot pre-empt a state law merely by promulgating a
conflicting statute-the pre-empting statute must also be constitutional, both on its face and
as applied.").
98. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
99. City ofNew York I, 179 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1999).
100. Id. at 35.
101. Id.
15
Michalove: Expanding Printz in the Sanctuary City Debate
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2018
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
constitutional analysis of § 1373 forecloses the relevance of the Supremacy
Clause. Had the court thoroughly considered the constitutional teachings of
Printz in determining the validity of § 1373, it would have concluded that
§ 1373 constitutes an invasion of state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment and, in turn, would never have reached the Supremacy Clause.
A. The Constitutional Teachings of Printz
In Printz, the Supreme Court affirmed an enduring federalist principle:
"It is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they remain
independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority. 
' 102
Printz involved a controversy between state law enforcement agents and the
command of a federal gun control regulatory scheme. Two state chief law
enforcement officers (CLEOs) challenged the constitutionality of interim
provisions of the Brady Act.'0 3 The Brady Act was an amendment to the
Gun Control Act of 1968,104 which governed the sale and possession of
firearms.' 05 The Brady Act's interim provisions required CLEOs to perform
background checks on handgun dealers engaged in the transfer of firearms
until Congress could institute a federal background check program under the
Gun Control Act.10 6 The CLEOs argued the provisions compelled state
officials to execute federal law in violation of their state sovereignty under
the Tenth Amendment. 107 The Court ruled in favor of the CLEOs.'
08
The Supreme Court engaged in a historical analysis of dual sovereignty
to locate the proximity of the interim provisions to the boundary of
Congress's constitutional authority.'0 9 The Court analyzed legislation from
the first Congresses and the Federalist Papers to conclude that while state
participation in federal regulatory schemes was both envisioned and
practiced in the Early Republic, such participation was contingent upon the
states' consent. 110 Significantly, the Court highlighted that where early
Congresses enacted naturalization and immigration laws, none compelled
the states to act or prohibited the states from acting."' Similarly, the Court
opined that although Congress has the power to regulate pursuant to its
102. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
103. Id. at 904.
104. Id. at 902.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 902-03.
107. Id. at 905.
108. Id. at 933.
109. Id. at 905-18.
110. Id.
111. Id. at906, 916.
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enumerated powers, it cannot "regulate state governments' regulation" of a
particular subject.1 2 Emphasizing the states' "inviolable sovereignty""' 3
explicit in the Tenth Amendment, the Court recalled that "the Framers
rejected the concept of a central government that would act upon and through
the States."'14
After examining the contours of the Tenth Amendment, the Court
harmonized state sovereignty with the mandate of the Supremacy Clause. 115
Parsing the language of the Supremacy Clause, the Court acknowledged that
it binds the states to uphold the "Law of the Land" yet impressed that only
laws which comport with the Constitution are validly the "Law of the
Land."' 16 Considering the CLEOs' argument that the interim provisions did
not comport with the Constitution, the Court disposed of the relevancy of the
Supremacy Clause, stating that it "merely brings us back to the
question... whether laws conscripting state officers violate state
sovereignty and are thus not in accord with the Constitution." 117 The Court
answered this question not through a mechanical application of the
Supremacy Clause, but rather through a holistic examination of "our
constitutional system of dual sovereignty. '  This suggests that the
Supremacy Clause does not provide a crystalline lens to conclusively resolve
an alleged Tenth Amendment violation, for its consideration merely led the
Court back to the Tenth Amendment itself.
The historical and constitutional analyses that informed the outcome of
Printz reflect two federalist principles that resurfaced in City of'New York II.
First, Congress cannot command the states to regulate a subject in a
particular way under the Tenth Amendment. 119 Second, the Supremacy
Clause cannot save federal legislation that is itself unconstitutional.
120
Collectively, it follows that the Supremacy Clause is inapposite where a
federal law requires the states to govern a subject in a particular way, for
what would otherwise be the "Law of the Land"'12 1 exceeds the boundaries
of the Constitution and is, by nature, beyond the reach of the Supremacy
112. Id. at 924 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
113. Id. at 919 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 198 (James Madison) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 924-25.
116. Id. at 924.
117. Id. at 925.
118. Id. at 935.
119. Id. at 924 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
120. Id. at 925-27.
121. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Clause. The Tenth Amendment, therefore, operates as a limitation on the
command of the Supremacy Clause, and they must rise and fall together.'22
In City of New York II, the City asked the Second Circuit to apply the
constitutional reasoning of Printz to its argument against § 1373.123
However, the Second Circuit engaged the City's request only superficially,
confining itself instead to the factual circumstances of Printz to guide its
opinion. The Second Circuit's analysis of the Tenth Amendment was
likewise cursory and, ultimately, led the court to a misinterpretation of the
Supremacy Clause that sealed its evaluation of § 1373.
B. An Inconsequential Factual Comparison of§ 1373 and Printz
In City of New York II, the Second Circuit anchored its reasoning in the
factual distinctions between the Brady Act and the directives of § 1373.124
The Second Circuit held that, unlike the Brady Act, § 1373 did not compel
the City to administer federal law in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 125
The court correctly distinguished the facts of Printz from the controversy
presented by the City. The issue in Printz arose from the Brady Act's
affirmative, federal directive that compelled states to execute a federal
law.126 It is likely a losing argument that § 1373 conscripts state executives;
it does not place any affirmative duty on state executives. 127 Indeed, the City
made no such argument. 128
Instead, the City argued that as a sovereign-and like the petitioner in
Printz-it had "the power to choose not to participate in federal regulatory
122. In City of New York II, the Second Circuit stated that the Tenth Amendment
"confirm[s] that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may... reserve
power to the States." City of New York II, 179 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting New York,
505 U.S. at 157). See also Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012)
("The independent power of the States ... serves as a check on the power of the Federal
Government....").
123. Appellants' Brief, supra note 16, at 41-50.
124. City ofNew York II, 179 F.3d at 34-35.
125. Id. at 35.
126. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898 (1997).
127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012).
128. The City briefly asserted that "[t]he whole object of [§ 1373] is to conscript State and
local employees as agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Appellants' Brief,
supra note 16, at 40-41. The context of this statement cannot be ignored. The City made this
claim in connection with an argument that the plain language of § 1373 is a pretext for
conscription and that § 1373 reflects the intent of Congress to convert state and local officials
into instrumentalities of federal immigration authorities. Id. This is distinct from an argument
that § 1373 does, in practical effect, conscript state and local officials as "agents" of the
federal government. Therefore, the City did not argue that § 1373 conscripts its officials in
the same manner that the interim provisions of the Brady Act conscripted the CLEOs in Printz.
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programs" and the power to enact the policies that § 1373 prohibits. 129 The
City drew not from the facts of Printz, but rather its federalist principles. It
argued that § 1373-which prohibited the policies of Mayor Koch's
executive order-constituted a "congressionally-imposed displacement of
the policy choices of the local electorate[,] demonstrat[ing] a lack of respect
for the local political process and diminish[ing] the dignity of State
sovereignty." '"3 The court's factual comparison of § 1373 and the Brady Act
thus resolved an argument that was never presented. Accordingly, although
the court proffered an accurate factual evaluation of § 1373, it did little to
explain how the doctrinal principles the Printz Court applied to the Brady
Act did not apply to §1373.
C. A Misguided Constitutional Analysis
Addressing the City's "scope-of-state-sovereignty argument," the
Second Circuit opined that it could "not read [Printz] so broadly" as
permitting states to prohibit cooperation with federal regulatory schemes.' 3'
However, its reading of Printz considered little more than its holding:
"Congress may not ... directly compel states or localities to enact or to
administer policies or programs adopted by the federal government."'
3 2
Where the court did note the constitutional teachings of Printz, it stopped
short of applying them to the City's argument against § 1373. Instead, the
court criticized the City's position by entertaining the political ramifications
of a world in which § 1373 violated the Tenth Amendment. This political
assessment ultimately led the court to the Supremacy Clause, through which
it upheld § 1373 with reasoning that, in the absence of a proper Tenth
Amendment analysis, is untenable.
1. A Shallow Tenth Amendment Analysis
In Printz, the Supreme Court provided an extensive analysis of the
structural framework of the Constitution's republican government that
illuminates both the federalist dynamic of the sovereigns and, as the City
argued before the Second Circuit, the effect of § 1373 on its sovereign
exercise of sanctuary policies.'33 However, the Second Circuit's reasoning
deviates from the principles of dual sovereignty established in Printz and
instead emphasizes potential policy ramifications:
129. City ofNew York I, 179 F.3d. at 34.
130. Appellants' Brief, supra note 16, at 45.
131. CityofNew YorklI, 179 F.3d. at 34.
132. Id.
133. Appellants' Brief, supra note 16, at 44-50.
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The City's sovereignty argument asks us to turn the Tenth Amendment's
shield against the federal government's using state and local governments to
enact and administer federal programs into a sword allowing states and
localities to engage in passive resistance that frustrates federal programs. If
Congress may not forbid states from outlawing even voluntary cooperation
with federal programs by state and local officials, states will at times have
the power to frustrate effectuation of some programs. Absent any
cooperation at all from local officials, some federal programs may fail or fall
short of their goals unless federal officials resort to legal processes in every
routine or trivial matter, often a practical impossibility. 1
34
The court's assertions contemplate plausible policy concerns yet gloss
over the constitutional relationship between federal and state governments
that the City asked the court to consider in analyzing § 1373.
The court conflates the political advantage of cooperation between the
sovereigns with a constitutional requirement that they do so. Instead of
considering § 1373 under the light of the Printz Court's discussion of states'
consent to participate in federal regulatory schemes, the court focused on the
policy implications of states' refusal to participate. While the execution of
federal immigration regulatory schemes might prove more efficient with the
cooperation of the City-and localities nationwide135 -the Constitution
guarantees neither the success nor the efficiency of federal programs 136 and
does not bind the states to such obligation. 137 Thus, when the court warned
that federal agencies may "fail or fall short of their goals" or be
inconvenienced by pursuing alternative means of local cooperation in the
absence of legislation like § 1373, it described political rather than
constitutional injuries to the Government. 138
Had the court applied the federalist principles articulated in Printz to
the City's Tenth Amendment argument, it would have properly concluded
134. City of New York 11, 179 F.3d at 35.
135. See Boatright, supra note 75, at 1637.
136. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 289 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Constitution does not permit efficiency to be our primary concern."); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) ("[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient,
and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is
contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or
the hallmarks-of democratic government .... ").
137. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) ("[T]he Framers explicitly
chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not
States."); THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 198 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan, eds., 2001) ("[T]he local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent
portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general
authority, than the general authority is subject to them within its own sphere.").
138. City of New York 11, 179 F.3d at 35.
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that § 1373 is unconstitutional. As the Printz Court asserted, "[e]ven where
Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to
require or prohibit those acts."' 3 9  Therefore, although Congress
unquestionably has the power to regulate immigration, 40 it does not have the
power to regulate state and local governance of law enforcement agencies
that operate under sanctuary policies.
Arguably, by prohibiting states and localities from implementing
particular law enforcement policies, § 1373 regulates the states' and
localities' regulation of policing and public safety. This violates Tenth
Amendment federalism principles by infringing on the state police power to
implement policies that local governments deem beneficial to public
safety. 141 Sanctuary policies are, therefore, no less within the province of the
states to enact, and no more within the province of the federal government
to regulate.
2. The Supremacy Clause Does Not Save § 1373
Glossing over the City's Tenth Amendment argument, the Second
Circuit reached its conclusion in precisely the manner that Printz foreclosed:
through a mechanical application of the Supremacy Clause. After
emphasizing the political effect of sanctuary cities on the enforcement of
federal immigration laws, the court stated that the Supremacy Clause
resolved this "potential for deadlock" by prohibiting state laws "that frustrate
federal laws and regulatory schemes.' ' 142 Invoking the Supremacy Clause,
the court held that "states do not retain under the Tenth Amendment an
untrammeled right to forbid all voluntary cooperation by state or local
officials with particular federal programs. '141 While this interpretation of
the Supremacy Clause is accurate in the abstract, 14 4 it is flawed in light of the
court's miscalculated treatment of the City's Tenth Amendment argument.
In determining the constitutionality of § 1373, the Supremacy Clause
offers the Second Circuit no more direction than it offered the Supreme Court
139. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at
166).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the power "[t]o establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization").
141. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "the regulation of health and safety matters
is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern." Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated
Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985).
142. City ofNew York I, 179 F.3d at 35.
143. Id.
144. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
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in Printz145 _it simply circles the inquiry back to whether § 1373 violates the
Tenth Amendment. By sealing a sphere of subjects for exclusive regulation
by the states, the Tenth Amendment invalidates federal laws that invade this
sphere. 146 When the Tenth Amendment invalidates a federal law which
would otherwise eclipse state law under the Supremacy Clause, the
Supremacy Clause cannot save it.147 Accordingly, a court cannot, without
more, invoke the Supremacy Clause to determine that a federal law does not
violate the Tenth Amendment when the gravamen of the controversy is that
the law was not "made in Pursuance [of the Constitution].', 148 Therefore, the
Second Circuit's reliance on the Supremacy Clause is misguided,
considering the City's argument that § 1373 lacks constitutional force all
together. 149 Furthermore, the Supremacy Clause is inapposite where the
court neglected to identify how precisely the City's sanctuary policy
"regulat[ed] conduct in a field that Congress ... has determined must be
regulated by its exclusive governance. ' ' O
Even if the Second Circuit was correct in upholding § 1373 as
constitutional, it failed to demonstrate how the City's sanctuary policy
obstructed the federal government's ability to execute its own objectives
under § 1373 and why the command of the Supremacy Clause must quash
the City's policy. The Second Circuit characterized the City's sanctuary
policy as a "sword" for "passive resistance" '' to federal immigration laws
without determining the precise function of sanctuary cities that obstructs
federal immigration law. The court appears to conclude that the City's
sanctuary policy obstructed federal immigration law based on the general
prohibition against information sharing with federal immigration authorities
and one provision that addressed the power of the City's patrollers. The
provision prohibited certain patrollers from transmitting information
regarding immigrants involved in criminal activity directly to federal
immigration authorities.1 2  The policy instead directed local law
enforcement agencies to designate select officers to be responsible for the
handling and sharing of such information.' Offering a mere recitation of
145. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924-25 (1997)
146. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-57 (1992).
147. Printz, 521 U.S. at 924-25.
148. Id. at 924 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
149. Appellants' Brief, supra note 16, at 49.
150. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
151. City of New York II, 179 F.3d at 35.
152. Id. at 32.
153. N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 124, § 2(c) (Aug. 7, 1989), https://perma.cc/2XZZ-
Q85R.
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this provision, the court undertook no examination of how the policy itself
actually impeded the effectuation of federal immigration law.
Likewise, the court appears to have overlooked the language that
followed the provision for patrollers: "Enforcement agencies, including the
Police Department and the Department of Correction, shall continue to
cooperate with federal authorities in investigating and apprehending aliens
suspected of criminal activity.' '154 If not compelled to do so before, this
language should have prompted the court to examine the operation and effect
of the City's sanctuary policy. This language indicates that the policy was
not a simple pledge to obstruct federal immigration law. Therefore, a
detailed analysis was necessary to discern the policy's legal relationship to
federal immigration law. Without scrutinizing the provisions of City's
sanctuary policy to highlight a conflict between it and § 1373, the court failed
to sufficiently analyze how the policy obstructed federal immigration law
from a legal-not merely a political-standpoint. 155 As a result of this
analytical lapse, the court's reliance on the Supremacy Clause was
improvident and ultimately fatal to the City's challenge of § 1373.
The Second Circuit's treatment of the City's sanctuary policy and
§ 1373 resulted in an incomplete analysis that misconstrues the federalist
balance of the Tenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause. Seemingly
paralyzed by the factual differences of Printz, the court upheld § 1373 as
constitutional without probing the federalist principles of Printz to ascertain
the scope of the City's police power under the Tenth Amendment. In turn,
the court's invocation of the Supremacy Clause not only contradicted
Printz-it also represented a myopic resolution of what has become an
enduring controversy.
III. HARMONIZING SANCTUARY CITIES AND FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW
Although City of New York II established that § 1373 is constitutional
and preempts sanctuary policies, sanctuary cities continue to survive
attempts at their abolition. 56 This anomaly represents an ongoing conflict
that influences elections, law-making, and discourse in all levels of
154. Id.
155. Even in the absence of this analysis, examples of state obstruction of federal
immigration law suggest the court's characterization of the City's sanctuary policy is
inaccurate. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (holding that provisions
of an Arizona state statute that attempted to implement arrest, registration, and criminalization
processes for undocumented immigrants were preempted by federal immigration law).
156. See Griffith & Vaughan, supra note 30.
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government. 157  The conflict between sanctuary cities and federal
immigration law can be eased by repealing § 1373 to foreclose the possibility
of future federal legislation that attempts to subvert sanctuary cities.
Alternatively, where disagreement persists in the debate regarding the
relationship between § 1373 and sanctuary cities, policymakers must
separate political ideologies of immigration from the underlying legal issue
of separation of powers and dual sovereignty.
A. Repeal § 1373 to Prevent Future Federal Legislation Attempting to
Subvert Sanctuary Cities
The simplest and most immediate solution to the conflict between
§ 1373 and sanctuary cities is to repeal § 1373. Although § 1373 has had
little success in interfering with the implementation and maintenance of
sanctuary policies, it has consumed the attention and resources of each the
executive, 158 legislative, 159 and judicial branches. 160  Thus, § 1373 has
enabled ongoing attempts to abolish sanctuary cities by providing a ground
for their purported invalidity.
The repeal of § 1373 would end all ongoing efforts to dismantle
sanctuary cities and prevent the proliferation of future attempts to do the
same. This would not only quell a significant piece of the national
immigration debate but also enable state and federal authorities to execute
their respective regulatory schemes without the overshadowing threat of
constitutional injury as alleged by either side. Without § 1373 and its genus
of federal prohibition, federal immigration authorities would be able to
enforce their civil regulatory schemes to achieve their mission of national
public safety, while sanctuary cities would be able to enforce their policing
regulations to achieve their mission of local public safety.
157. See ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., How AMERICANS VIEW
IMMIGRANTS, AND WHAT THEY WANT FROM IMMIGRATION REFORM (2016),
https://perma.cc/5A5W-ET4T (discussing opposing views of immigration among partisan
and geographical divides); POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, LOCAL POLICE PERSPECTIVES ON
STATE IMMIGRATION POLICIES 9 (2014) ("[I]mmigration policy has become increasingly
fragmented across the country, with states enacting individual laws that reflect their own
political, demographic, and ideological landscapes.").
158. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
159. See, e.g., No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, H.R. 3003, 115th Cong. (2017).
160. See, e.g., City of New York II, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999); Cry. of Santa Clara v.
Trump, No. 17-cv-574-WHO; No.17-cv-00485-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62871 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 25, 2017); Steinle v. City of S.F., 230 F. Supp. 3d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Sturgeon
v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
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Alternatively, if the repeal of § 1373 is unfeasible due to persisting
disagreement as to the validity of sanctuary cities, the following solution
offers a strategy that can facilitate a definitive resolution to the controversy.
B. Separate Political Ideologies of Immigration from the Underlying
Issue.- Separation of Powers and Dual Sovereignty
Considering the enduring clash between § 1373 and sanctuary cities, it
can reasonably be anticipated that the controversy will not be resolved in a
manner as stark as the repeal of § 1373. If the controversy is to continue, it
must proceed with a different approach than has been used since City of New
York, for the dispute is currently no less impassioned than it was at its
inception nearly twenty years ago. If policymakers are to come to an accord
regarding the future of sanctuary cities, they must distill the politics of U.S.
immigration from the principles of federalism.
Federal immigration law and sanctuary cities both fuel one of the most
divisive issues in American politics: foreign migration to the United States.
However, despite this overlap, it is critical to recognize that sanctuary cities
touch this issue only tangentially-if at all. Although the state government
officials who draft sanctuary policies may be politically opposed to certain
components of federal immigration law or its surrounding rhetoric, the
sanctuary policies they ultimately issue are not political ploys to
counterattack unsavory federal immigration policy. Instead, they are
political devices to promote the welfare of their local communities. Any
frustrating effect sanctuary policies have on federal immigration law must
then be treated as political rather than legal.
Where current and future federal officials attempt to change the nation's
immigration policies, they must appreciate that whether the federal
government should condemn sanctuary policies is not the same inquiry as
whether it has the constitutional authority to do so. The importance of this
distinction was underscored in City of Chicago v. Sessions,16 1 in which the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the
executive branch lacked constitutional authority to impose certain conditions
on federal grants issued in support of state and local law enforcement
agencies. 162 The conditions would have enabled federal authorities to access
information regarding the release of inmates suspected of immigration
161. City of Chi. v. Sessions, No. 1:17-CV-05720, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 15, 2017).
162. Id. at *22. However, the court upheld a separate condition requiring grant recipients
to comply with § 1373. Id. at *27-28.
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violations-information ostensibly withheld under sanctuary policies. 163
The court ruled that the executive branch could not exercise such power
without delegation from Congress. It also recognized that whether Congress
itself possesses such authority would require a separate inquiry under the
Spending Clause. 1
64
The executive and legislative branches cannot minimize the
implications of Sessions. Sessions demonstrates that the law does not
necessarily provide a channel for political opposition to sanctuary cities, the
popularity or force of such opposition notwithstanding. Sessions is the
second case in which a federal court has found the executive branch in excess
of its constitutional authority to take action against sanctuary cities. It was
decided only five months after County of Santa Clara v. Trump,165 in which
President Trump's executive order attempting to withhold federal funding
from sanctuary cities was held unconstitutional. 166 In turn, the executive
branch must acknowledge that when it takes aim at sanctuary cities, it may
only end up striking its own resources when a court is compelled to enjoin
its measures. 16 7  Likewise, Congress must legislate with prudence and
foresight to avoid a similar outcome. This charge is nonetheless imperative
as Congress considers H.R. 3003. H.R. 3003 contains a condition tying
federal grants to state and local compliance with § 1373, the constitutionality
of which-as warned in Sessions-is subject to question. 168
Sessions also serves as a charge to the Supreme Court. In Sessions, the
court stated that § 1373 "may implicate the logic underlying the Printz
decision" in that it "may effectively thwart policymakers' ability to extricate
their state or municipality from involvement in a federal program."'
169
Nonetheless, acknowledging City of New York H and the distinct
163. Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, City of
Chi. v. Sessions, No. 1:17-CV-05720, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15,
2017).
164. Sessions, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847, at *22.
165. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-574-WHO; No.17-cv-00485-WHO, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62871 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017).
166. Id.
167. The loss of resources within the executive branch represents only a fraction of the
risk that its actions created. Together, Trump and Sessions involved over forty briefs and the
work of more than 100 lawyers in thirteen different states. See id. at * 1 -11; Reply Brief in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 16, City of Chi. v. Sessions, No.
1:17-CV-05720, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017); Defendant's
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 26, City of Chi. v. Sessions,
No. 1:17-CV-05720, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017).
168. See No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, H.R. 3003, 115th Cong. (2017); Sessions, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847, at *22.
169. Sessions, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149847, at *37.
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circumstances that gave rise to Printz, the court stated that holding § 1373
unconstitutional "would require an expansion of the law that only a higher
court could establish."' 17 0 The Supreme Court could expand Printz in
precisely the manner the Sessions court suggested and the City advocated for
in City of New York II: through its constitutional logic. Should the Supreme
Court have the opportunity to rule § 1373 unconstitutional, it must
distinguish the facts of Printz from its federalist underpinnings. Moreover,
the Court must distinguish any political ramifications of striking down
§ 1373 from its legal duty "to say what the law is.' 17 1
The extraction of immigration politics from the sanctuary city debate
will enable the examiner to analyze the components of sanctuary policies to
determine whether and how they affect the execution of federal immigration
law. Without the interference of ideological clashes, the determination can
be made pursuant to constitutional principles of separation of powers and
dual sovereignty, rather than political majorities. In turn, a constitutionally
refined analysis of sanctuary policies will inform the constitutionality of
§ 1373 and similar measures.
CONCLUSION
City of New York decided the fate of § 1373 that has since been a
platform for executive and legislative blasting of sanctuary cities.
Nonetheless, sanctuary cities have withstood attempts at subversion and
continue to exist across the nation. This conflict indicates a profound discord
in our nation's understanding of state police power and its relationship to
federal immigration law.
Considering the principles of dual sovereignty that informed the
Court's reasoning in Printz, Congress cannot prohibit states or localities
from implementing sanctuary policies as mandated in § 1373 and as
proposed in H.R. 3003. Instead, Congress can repeal § 1373 to eliminate
current and future risks that the federal government will usurp the power of
the states to implement policing schemes that serve the public health,
welfare, safety, and morals of their communities.
Alternatively, if Congress cannot agree that § 1373 violates the Tenth
Amendment, or that it should otherwise be abrogated, it is paramount that
policymakers distinguish political frustration from legal frustration when
attempting to resolve the conflict around sanctuary cities. While the two can
overlap, it is important to discern where they do not. Despite the practical
or political frustrations that sanctuary policies may pose to federal
170. Id. at *38.
171. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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lawmakers, they cannot be deemed to obstruct federal immigration law
where they regulate the policing priorities of local law enforcement agencies.
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